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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Across the Internet, mistaken and malicious routing announcements impose
significant costs on users and network operators. To make routing announcements
more reliable and secure, Internet coordination bodies have encouraged network
operators to adopt the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (“RPKI”) framework.
Despite this encouragement, RPKI’s adoption rates are low, especially in North
America.
RPKI is a two-sided framework, and on both sides of the framework North
American networks lag behind their peers around the globe. For RPKI to provide
increased security, networks must first issue route origin authorizations (“ROAs”) to
cover their Internet Protocol (“IP”) address space. Other networks must also conduct
route origin validation (“ROV”) on the basis of these ROAs to ensure that routing
announcements originate from authorized parties.
Recent analysis has suggested that North American networks have issued
proportionately fewer ROAs than networks around the globe. Further, when
conducting ROV, networks worldwide are less likely to validate routes against North
American ROAs than against ROAs issued by networks in other regions of the world.
In other words, a material portion of networks conducting ROV do not validate routes
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originating from North American networks. Taken together, these two analyses paint
a problematic picture. North American networks are less likely than their global
peers to publish ROAs, and when they do, their ROAs are less likely to be utilized in
determining routing tables.
This report presents the results of a year-long investigation into the
hypothesis—widespread within the network operator community—that legal issues
pose barriers to RPKI adoption and are one cause of the disparities between North
America and other regions of the world. On the basis of interviews and analysis of
the legal framework governing RPKI, the report evaluates the issues raised by
community members and proposes a number of strategies to reduce or circumvent
the barriers that are material. The report also describes substantial action taken this
year by the American Registry for Internet Numbers (“ARIN”) and other private
organizations in light of public dialogue about RPKI.
RPKI presents a classic “chicken-and-egg” problem: While adoption may be net
beneficial to the Internet community as a whole, its attractiveness to any individual
network operator depends on expectations about other operators’ willingness to
adopt. The legal issues analyzed in this report are sources of friction. They deter
individual actors from adopting RPKI on the merits, which in turn leads to reduced
expectations about the prospects for mass adoption in the future. Reduction of these
sources of friction would spur RPKI adoption through two mechanisms. First, reduced
legal barriers would make RPKI more attractive to network operators considering
whether to implement RPKI. Second, a marginal shift may alter other network
participants’ expectations about the future of RPKI. When everyone expects more
adoption, more adoption will take place. Any reduction in the legal barriers to
adoption thus may contribute to a positive feedback loop that can promote wider
deployment of RPKI.
Our recommendations mainly focus on the two sides of the RPKI framework:
issuing ROAs for inclusion in RPKI repositories and conducting ROV on the basis of
RPKI repository information. Though ROAs are logically prior to ROV in the
production sequence, the legal issues surrounding ROV are more significant than
those surrounding the issuance of ROAs. Therefore, we address them first. On the
ROV side of the equation, the principal legal obstacles stem from the terms and
conditions governing access to the RPKI repository offered by ARIN in its Relying
Party Agreement (“RPA”) and the manner it employs to ensure the agreement is
binding.
Over the course of the past year, ARIN—a private, nonprofit organization that
serves as the Regional Internet Registry (“RIR”) for the United States, Canada, and
part of the Caribbean—has made a salutary change to its RPA in response to
community dialogue. Specifically, ARIN enabled third-party software developers to
incorporate acceptance of the RPA into their software workflow. If developers
capitalize on this change, network operators will be able to rely on third-party
software to access the ARIN RPKI repository more easily. This change built on
ARIN’s decision in 2016 to move from a cumbersome email-based method of RPA
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acceptance to a browser interface-based method. ARIN has also been an active
participant in dialogue about further potential changes to support RPKI adoption.
This report is meant to spur further dialogue by clarifying key topics of debate.
It recommends the following:
1. The goal of widespread ROV counsels in favor of ARIN reviewing its current
approach to repository distribution, embodied in the RPA. We conclude that
two paths would be reasonable. First, ARIN should consider dropping the
RPA altogether. This would remove the most significant legal barriers to
widespread utilization of the ARIN RPKI repository. Second, because the
legal risks faced by ARIN in an RPA-free world are ultimately uncertain, it
would also be reasonable for ARIN to maintain the RPA for the purposes of
contractually allocating risks to the parties best positioned to reduce and
mitigate them. If ARIN keeps the RPA, ARIN should consider removing the
RPA’s indemnification clause, instead of relying solely on the RPA’s
disclaimers of warranties and limitations of liability, or at least reducing
the indemnification clause’s scope to eliminate the problem of moral hazard.
2. Developers of RPKI validation software should consider integrating
acceptance of ARIN’s RPA into their software workflows. ARIN recently
enabled this possibility, and developers should deliberate on whether to
capitalize on the opportunity.
3. The network operator community and ARIN should more broadly publicize
ARIN’s policy of revising various RPA clauses for government entities that
are prohibited from agreeing to them.
4. In addition to the important step ARIN has already taken to enable thirdparty software developers to integrate RPA acceptance into their software
workflows, ARIN should consider reducing the barriers to third-party
service development imposed by the RPA’s prohibited conduct clause.
Specifically, ARIN should consider methods for allowing approved
developers to make use of RPKI information as an input into more
sophisticated services.
5. Separately, ARIN should consider revising the prohibited conduct clause to
allow broader distribution of information created with RPKI as an input for
research and analysis purposes.
6. As a general alternative, the Internet community should consider whether
to develop a separate corporate entity that would be responsible for
operational aspects of RPKI repository provision. That corporation could
conduct such activities for the North American region, or on a worldwide
basis.
Regarding the ROA-issuance side of the equation, the principal legal obstacles
stem from the terms and conditions found in ARIN’s Registration Services Agreement
(“RSA”), Legacy Registration Services Agreement (“LRSA”), and RPKI Terms of
Service. Regarding these, the report recommends the following:
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1. ARIN should consider adopting a pathway to provide RPKI services that
would explicitly refrain from altering the existing balance of property and
transferability rights associated with legacy IP address allocations.
2. The network operator community and ARIN should broadly publicize
ARIN’s policy of revising certain RSA/LRSA and RPKI Terms of Service
clauses for government entities that are prohibited from agreeing to them,
including indemnification, arbitration, and choice of law clauses. ARIN
should also begin presenting the RPKI Terms of Service to newly-onboarded
members alongside their RSA/LRSA, so that organizations spend less time
dealing with legal issues overall.
Separately, the report recommends that the network operator community
consider whether to encourage companies and the federal government to include
RPKI adoption in procurement best practices or requirements.
In tandem with recommendations designed to encourage adoption, the report
also makes two recommendations concerning operational readiness for widespread
RPKI deployment. Specifically:
1. To reduce any legal risks associated with RPKI, the network operator
community should focus on adopting operational best practices. No system
is 100% reliable across all contingencies; as a result, operators should
prepare for outages and other headaches. RPKI implementations should be
resilient in the face of such contingencies.
2. The five RIRs should work to ensure readiness for widespread RPKI
adoption and strive to publicize deeper details on their service-level
intentions to the Internet community.
All of these recommendations are meant to be consistent with the goals
espoused in the IETF Requests for Comments (“RFCs”) that set standards for RPKI1
and with ARIN’s Articles of Incorporation.2
1. INTRODUCTION
The networks constituting the global Internet employ the Border Gateway
Protocol (“BGP”) to publish routing announcements. These announcements advertise
potential pathways across which data can travel from one endpoint to another.
Individual networks rely on them to build forwarding tables, which determine data
paths. The contents of those tables are important. If a table contains a route derived
See, e.g., Matt Lepinski & Stephen Kent, An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing, IETF
RFC 6480 (rel. Feb. 2012), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6480; Randy Bush, Origin Validation
Operation Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), IETF RFC 7115 (rel. Jan. 2014),
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7115 [hereinafter “RFC 7115”].
1

See
Articles
of
Incorporation,
https://www.arin.net/about_us/corp_docs/artic_incorp.html.
2
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(Aug.

7,

1997),
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from an erroneous or fraudulent announcement, then data might be sent in a
direction that prevents them from reaching their true destination or sent through a
network controlled by a malicious actor.
Despite these security threats, network operators do not typically authenticate
route announcements. BGP does not contain security features to ensure routing
accuracy. Rather, BGP operates on a “transitive trust” model, where networks often
assume that the routes advertised by their neighboring networks are, in fact, viable.
This leaves BGP “surprisingly vulnerable to attack.”3 In April 2018, malicious actors
successfully executed a routing hijack to redirect traffic meant for Amazon Route 53,
Amazon’s authoritative Domain Name System (“DNS”) service. This attack
facilitated the theft of approximately $150,000 in cryptocurrency.4 Months later,
hijackers attacked major credit card processors based in the United States.5 The
public record of similar attacks and routing mistakes is growing,6 and it is possible
that other incidents have taken place but escaped public notice.
One partial solution to the problem of BGP security is the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (“RPKI”). RPKI complements BGP’s “transitive trust” system with an
additional layer of security generated by an “anchored trust” system. RPKI’s system
is based on public-key cryptography. Under RPKI, regional Internet registries
(“RIRs”)—the organizations responsible for allocating and managing Internet
Protocol (“IP”) addresses and Autonomous System (“AS”) numbers to the Internet’s
many participating networks—serve as trust anchors for an authentication system.
They do so by allocating private cryptographic keys to the holders of IP addresses.
These keys allow their holders to publish secure digital objects called “Route Origin
Authorizations” (“ROAs”), which establish which networks are authorized to
originate routes associated with particular IP addresses. The existence of these ROAs
enables other parties to validate the authenticity of route announcements: One can
validate a route announcement by comparing its point of origin with the ROAs
contained in the RPKI repository maintained by the RIR that issued the address
prefix. This process is known as Route Origin Validation (“ROV”).7 Networks can then
adopt various practices to filter routes appropriately based on ROV information.

Sharon Goldberg, Why Is It Taking So Long to Secure Internet Routing?, ACM QUEUE (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668966.
3

See Doug Madory, BGP Hijack of Amazon DNS to Steal Cryptocurrency, ORACLE DYN VANTAGEPOINT
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-hijack-of-amazon-dns-to-steal-crypto-currency/. This
incident illustrates that routing attacks can be used to affect critical Internet services like
authoritative DNS resolution, which, given migration to the cloud, can affect what used to be internal
systems.
4

See Doug Madory, BGP/DNS Hijacks Target Payment Systems, ORACLE DYN VANTAGEPOINT (Aug. 3,
2018), https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-dns-hijacks-target-payment-systems/.
5

See SANDRA MURPHY, ROUTING SECURITY AND RPKI at 3-4 (Nov. 17, 2015), available at
https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/04-Murphy-StLouis.pdf.
6
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Validators typically cache ROAs instead of looking them up in the RPKI repository every time.
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RPKI is only a partial solution to the problem of BGP security because it does
not account for the entire routing path. But its value should not be discounted merely
because it is not a panacea. As Internet topology increasingly shifts toward a world
where there are fewer hops between origin and endpoint,8 a routing announcement’s
origin represents a comparatively significant portion of its full path. In the limit,
where there is only one hop between origin and endpoint, origin validation is path
validation. Thus, the value of RPKI is even higher among parties that utilize short
paths to reach each other. Among near neighbors in network topology, RPKI’s origin
validation framework is a particularly important contribution to routing security.
RPKI is a two-sided framework. For it to be successful, network operators must
use private keys to sign and publish certificates authenticating the origins of routes
for IP addresses under their control. Then they must also filter routes in their routing
tables based on the certificates provided by other networks, while following best
practices to ensure such filtering is done safely and wisely. Roughly speaking, the
value of adopting RPKI increases with the number of other networks that have also
adopted RPKI—a classic network effect. Moreover, the value on each side of the
framework increases with the number of participants on the other side, which makes
the network effect two-sided. The more ROAs there are (assuming accuracy), the
higher the value of engaging in ROV. In turn, the more participants that engage in
ROV, the higher the value of issuing ROAs.
Despite the fact that leading coordination bodies such as the Internet
Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) Working Group on Secure Inter-Domain Routing
(“SIDR”), RIRs, and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) have long promoted RPKI adoption,9 adoption rates remain low globally.
North American adoption levels (the subject of this paper) remain below the adoption
rates seen in Europe and Latin America (as depicted in Figure 1). On the signing side,
data collected by U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)
indicate that the percentage of IPv4 address space covered by ROAs in the ARIN
region has lagged behind the levels achieved in the areas governed by Réseaux IP
Européens (“RIPE”) (covering Europe and the portions of Asia within the Middle East
and Russia) and the Latin American and Caribbean Information Centre (“LACNIC”)
(covering Latin America and some of the Caribbean). Somewhat curiously, ROA
See Christopher S. Yoo, Paul Baran, Network Theory, and the Past, Present, and Future of the
Internet, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
8

See WILLIAM HAAG, DOUG MONTGOMERY, WILLIAM C. BARKER, & ALLEN TAN, NIST SPECIAL
PUBLICATION 1800-14: PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNET ROUTING: BORDER GATEWAY
PROTOCOL
(BGP)
ROUTE
ORIGIN
VALIDATION
(2018),
available
at
https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/sp1800/sidr-piir-nist-sp1800-14-draft.pdf (draft);
Secure Interdomain Routing (sidr), IETF, https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/about/ (last visited Dec.
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DOUGLAS MONTGOMERY, DRAFT NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-189: SECURE INTERDOMAIN TRAFFIC
EXCHANGE: BGP ROBUSTNESS AND DDOS MITIGATION (Dec. 2018) (on file with authors and likely
available
upon
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government
funding
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https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-189/draft).
9
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coverage in the ARIN region declined from September 2016 to September 2018. The
recovery in the last quarter of 2018 only succeeded in bringing ARIN ROA coverage
back to near the 2016 levels.

Source: Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., RPKI Deployment Monitor,
https://www.nist.gov/services-resources/software/nist-rpki-deploymentmonitor-and-test-system (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
On the filtering side, a recent study indicated that the number of networks
engaging in ROV filtering in the ARIN region falls far below the number of networks
engaging in ROV filtering in the RIPE region.10 Another study concluded that 20% of
the networks engaging in ROV filtering are not including the RPKI repository serving
the ARIN region.11
There are some indications that networks are beginning to show greater
interest in RPKI adoption. Major network participants including Google and
Cloudflare have indicated that they plan to begin implementing RPKI in the near
future.12 Discussions on the mailing lists and at the meetings of the North American
See Measuring RPKI Route Origin Validation Deployment, ROV DEPLOYMENT MONITOR,
https://rov.rpki.net/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
10

See Ben Cartwright-Cox, The State of RPKI: Q4 2018, BEN’S BLOG (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/state-of-rpki-in-2018.
11

See, e.g., Chris Morrow, Network Security Engineer, Google, So I Need to Start Route Filtering
Peers, Remarks at the Route Security Track: BGP Route Security, 74th Meeting of the North American
Network
Operators
Group
(NANOG
74)
(Oct.
2,
2018),
available
at
https://pc.nanog.org/static/published/meetings/NANOG74/1760/20181003_Tzvetanov_Security_Track
_Bgp_v1.pdf; Jérôme Fleury & Louis Poinsignon, RPKI and BGP: our path to securing Internet
12
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Network Operators Group (“NANOG”) and ARIN suggest that others are thinking of
joining them soon.
Over the past few years, a number of network operators in North America and
around the world have suggested that legal issues might be playing some role in
holding back adoption. These claims raise concerns with the background law
governing liability for using systems like RPKI and specific issues with the
agreements that the RIRs have been using to govern the treatment of RPKI
resources. But so far, the networking community’s understanding of these legal issues
has remained somewhat informal. On the basis of stakeholder interviews and
independent analysis, this report aims to clarify and assess those issues, and then to
recommend potential solutions.
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
on where legal issues fit into the “stack” of considerations facing individuals within
organizations contemplating adopting RPKI. Section 3 focuses on the route-filtering
side of the RPKI equation, assessing the perceived legal barriers and proposing
potential solutions designed to help remove or mitigate the effect of those barriers.
Section 4 conducts a similar analysis on the ROA-signing side of the equation. Section
5 broadens the lens beyond potential legal barriers to discuss how affirmative
strategies, including procurement contracts and increased activity by industry
organizations, might be used to promote RPKI adoption. Section 6 discusses the
importance of operational best practices among network operators and RIRs. Section
7 concludes.
2. RPKI IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Decisions about whether to adopt RPKI are made by the networks that
comprise the global Internet, including large end users, “last mile” Internet service
providers, transit providers, backbone providers, and Internet exchange points,
among others. Within those organizations, judgments about RPKI’s costs and benefits
are most likely to be made by network engineers. As the actors primarily responsible
for dealing with the problems RPKI is meant to address, they are the natural
advocates for it. Furthermore, these engineers pay attention to the standardsdevelopment work that has promoted RPKI. They are often members of professional
communities like the North American Network Operators Group (“NANOG”), which
offer technical support to would-be adopters.
The RPKI adoption decision involves considerations beyond the technology’s
merits. Network engineers face myriad demands on their scarce time and financial
resources. As a result, they must weigh the value of adopting RPKI against its costs—
including the opportunity costs of foregone effort on other projects. They must also
consider whether other departments and functions within their organizations have
Routing, CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/; Martin J. Levy,
RPKI – The required cryptographic upgrade go BGP routing, CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki/.
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stakes in the decision to adopt RPKI, which varies by organization based on their
particular risk and legal review practices. This is one place where legal questions
come into play. Because RPKI raises potential operational risks if not implemented
properly, network engineers interested in adopting it must consider whether and how
to engage their colleagues in legal and procurement departments. They must weigh
the cost of such engagement both in terms of time and institutional capital. Budgets
are not infinite, and RPKI is a technically complex framework to explain. As a result,
any issue—even a seemingly small one—can put a weight on the scale against
adoption, especially early on in the accumulation of network effects, where the value
of adoption to first movers can be low. This is not unique to RPKI, of course, but it
can be significant.
3. ROUTE VALIDATION AND FILTERING
Just as RPKI can be viewed as two interrelated processes—ROA issuance and
ROV-based filtering—the legal framework can also be divided into two distinct
portions. The first we will address is ROV-based route filtering.
To improve the security of routing, the design of the RPKI framework
contemplates that networks will filter routes based on RPKI information. That is,
networks are encouraged to adopt best practices regarding dropping routes that are
not authenticated, while also maintaining reliable fallback configurations to account
for the risk of faults or unavailability of the RPKI service itself.
Networks deploying RPKI can follow different adoption paths. Some networks
may filter based on their own ROV analysis. Or, as is often the case with specialpurpose additions to Internet security efforts, networks may seek to rely on
information provided by third parties that offer ROV either as a commercial service
or as a free service. Due to the benefits of specialization and scale economies, the
latter might enable growth in the value of RPKI information—for instance, if a
private company or open-source provider offered a set of route filters based on RPKI
information in tandem with other information, such as information obtained from
Internet Routing Registries (“IRRs”).
In any case, parties conducting ROV need access to the RPKI repositories of
the RIRs. From a legal perspective, this means that key issues include (a) access to
the RPKI repositories and (b) redistribution of those repositories and information
developed based on them. This Section discusses those issues. It is motivated by the
objective of fostering broad distribution and use of RPKI-based route analysis,
consistent with reasonable allocation of risks and duties among stakeholders.
3.1 Background
Access to RPKI informational repositories is necessary for anyone who wants
to conduct ROV and is thus essential to RPKI’s success. The RPKI repositories
represent the “public” portion of the public key infrastructure. Repositories for each
region of the globe are provided by the RIRs for those regions. The technical designers
9

of the system envisioned they would be widely distributed around the world and that
any party engaging in ROV worldwide would do so for all routes worldwide. The
nature of repository distribution means that the providers and users are in a
relationship with each other with potential legal implications in cases where the use
of RPKI leads to harm. Providers and users may both want to structure that
relationship to allocate rights and responsibilities over the production, distribution,
and use of repository information in a sensible manner.
Each RIR has the authority to structure access to its own repository of RPKI
information as it sees fit. For North America, the source of this information is the
American Registry for Internet Numbers (“ARIN”) RPKI repository, which includes
ARIN’s repository of RPKI certificates, certificate revocation lists, signed objects, and
ARIN’s public key.13 Parties wishing to conduct ROV for route announcements for
locations originating in North America need access to the authentic ARIN Repository.
Such access is provided via a file called a Trust Anchor Locator (“TAL”).
The key legal document governing access to ARIN’s repository is called the
Relying Party Agreement (“RPA”). To access ARIN’s repository, parties must
download the TAL file from an ARIN website. This webpage contains a statement
that “[t]he ARIN Repository is available to anyone under the terms and conditions in
the Relying Party Agreement,” immediately followed by a link to the RPA.14 The
agreement is what lawyers call “browsewrap.”15 This means that the webpage visitor
does not need to affirmatively click on an acceptance box in order to access resources,
but the webpage states that use of the resources constitutes an agreement to be bound
by the terms contained in the document accessible through a link on the webpage.
That statement and the link are prominently displayed in a visitor’s visual field.
Though courts are wary of enforcing browsewrap against unwitting parties, they are
willing to do so where parties have actual or constructive knowledge of the
agreement’s existence. This is especially true if the party is sophisticated. As a result,
ARIN’s RPA would likely be held to bind network operators utilizing ARIN’s RPKI
repository.
Interviewees suggest that the RPA is a major source of stakeholder concern
over the legal framework governing the filtering side of RPKI. These concerns are
described and evaluated in the Sections that follow. In Section 3.2, we evaluate the
legal impediments to direct repository access—the kind of access that a party would
seek if they were planning on doing their own ROV. We also report on changes made
during the past year that alleviate some of these impediments. In Section 3.3, we
propose reforms to overcome remaining impediments. In Section 3.4, we address
See Trust Anchor Locator (TAL), ARIN, available at https://www.arin.net/resources/rpki/tal.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter “ARIN TAL”].
13

See
ARIN,
Resource
Certification
Relying
Party
Agreement,
available
at
https://www.arin.net/resources/rpki/rpa.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter “ARIN RPA”].
14
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13.
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issues specific to governmental entities seeking direct repository access. In Section
3.5, we address legal impediments to indirect repository access—the kind of access a
party would receive from an intermediary offering ROV as a commercial service or as
a free service. We describe changes made during the past year to reduce some of these
barriers and evaluate and propose reforms to the remaining ones.
3.2 Legal Barriers to Direct Repository Access
Each RIR should ensure that it distributes its RPKI repository in a manner
consistent with the goals of widespread RPKI adoption and a proper allocation of the
rights and responsibilities for safe RPKI usage. A number of interviewees with whom
we spoke as part of our research suggested that some tension exists between those
two goals, especially in a relatively litigious region such as North America. In that
region, the organization tasked with navigating the tension is ARIN. This Section
introduces ARIN and its Relying Party Agreement.
Background on ARIN. ARIN is a private, member-driven non-profit
organization founded in 1997 that serves as the RIR for the United States, Canada,
and part of the Caribbean and until 2002 also served as the RIR for Latin America
and Africa. It has a budget of $22 million annually, funded entirely by member
registration fees and dues without any governmental support. It began participating
in RPKI along with its peer RIRs in 2008. Since initiating its RPKI efforts, ARIN has
not engaged in attempts at direct cost recovery for RPKI provision. Instead, it funds
its RPKI efforts out of its general, member-funded budget. ARIN estimates that over
the last ten years, it has spent approximately $6 million dollars on RPKI service
development. These efforts have included software and web interface development;
the procurement, configuration, and operation of a hardware security module; system
maintenance; legal analysis and evaluation; and promotional activities.
The role of the RPA. Early in our course of interviews, a number of
interviewees noted that, unlike the other four RIRs, ARIN required would-be route
origin validators to download its RPKI repository from the ARIN website. In contrast,
the other four RIRs allow the TALs for their repositories to be included in software
downloads without having to affirmatively accept any specific terms of service. For
instance, RIPE Network Coordination Centre (“RIPE NCC”) offers the most popular
validator software. When a user downloads the RIPE NCC software, the package
comes with four of the five RPKI repositories preloaded, but the page states that “[t]o
access ARIN’s [resources], you will have to agree to ARIN’s Relying Party Agreement.
Please visit [ARIN’s] web page for more information.”16 Similarly, a validator
provided by Dragon Research Labs similarly includes the TALs for four of the RIRs
and omits the ARIN TAL. This difference is driven by heightened concerns about legal
risk in the litigious North American region and by the requirement of contract
See RIPE NCC, rpki-validator, GITHUB, at lines 140-55 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://github.com/RIPENCC/rpki-validator/blob/rpki-validator-2.24/rpki-validator-app/README.txt.
16
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doctrine in the United States that agreements be prominently placed in order to be
binding.
The requirement of agreeing to the RPA to gain access to ARIN’s repository
raised technical and institutional concerns for interviewees. We discuss each in turn.
Technical concerns. As a technical matter, interviewees reported that the
placement of the ARIN TAL separately from the others creates friction that makes
ROV setup more onerous. In particular, it inhibits automated distribution of the
validator software. It also raises the risk that engineers will forget or refuse to
download ARIN’s repository resources or simply reject ROV altogether.17 While, given
time and focus, the process of downloading and incorporating an extra TAL into
validation software is well within the capacity of the average network engineer, time
and focus are inevitably in scarce supply. Especially because mistakes in the
configuration of RPKI validation software can have negative consequences, network
engineers are loath to implement ROV into production unless they are confident it
can be managed effectively over the long term.
Over the course of the year of this study, network engineers had the
opportunity to present their concerns over the ARIN RPA’s placement in a number of
fora. As a result of that dialogue, ARIN took the step of explicitly enabling third
parties to develop software installation tools that handle the repository-collection
process for their users. Specifically, ARIN now allows third-party software providers
to collect acceptances to the RPA as a part of a user interface rather than requiring a
separate visit to the ARIN website.18 This has the potential to be a useful step in
reducing the barriers to RPKI adoption because it enables the development of turnkey
ROV solutions. To capitalize on it, developers of ROV software should consider
designing their software to prompt users to accept the ARIN RPA and conduct ROV
for all five global regions. This may require deviating from the practice of enabling
automated installation. Interviewees were enthusiastic about third-party software to
help solve the chicken-and-egg problem facing RPKI, so exploiting this path may
prove important to RPKI’s ultimate success. Further discussion on this point can be
found in Section 3.5, “Legal Barriers to Indirect Use,” below.
One other interface design for ensuring RPA acceptance was proposed by
interviewees. The proposal was to embed the RPA into the source code of a software
package (like OpenBSD) or directly into the TAL file, itself. Indeed, a recent change
to the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) TAL definition seems to contemplate
the latter approach.19 This approach to creating a binding contract is common in open
source software distribution. It is attractive because it facilitates automation in the
17

This risk is borne out in data, as discussed supra note 11 and accompanying text.

See John Curran, President and CEO of ARIN, Software installation tools retrieving ARIN TAL
(was: Re: ARIN RPKI TAL deployment issues), NANOG MAILING LIST (Oct. 13, 2018),
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-October/097528.html.
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See Geoff Huston, Samuel Weiler, George Michaelson, Stephen Kent, & Tim Bruijnzeels, Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-05, IETF INTERNET
DRAFT (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-05.
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installation process. Unfortunately, we do not view it as a sufficiently reliable method
of establishing a binding contract in the RPKI context. To create a binding
browsewrap agreement, a user must have actual or constructive knowledge of the
agreement. In the case of open source software, a coder would have such knowledge
of the contents of the source code due to the practical necessity of inspecting the
source code in the course of software development. But in the RPKI case, there is no
reason for a repository user to inspect the TAL file’s contents. Indeed, one of the
reasons for seeking a way to streamline the RPA-acceptance process is to make it so
network engineers do not have to fiddle with TAL files as they begin engaging in
ROV. As a result, including the RPA in source code would not reliably ensure that
anyone is actually seeing the RPA. Therein lies the problem. The proposed method
would not reliably create a binding agreement. While parties that actually know
about an agreement buried in source code (for instance, because they saw a
presentation an NANOG about it) might be deemed bound by it,20 those ignorant of
it would not be bound by it under U.S. common law. Therefore, assuming it is valuable
to have an RPA—an assumption we explore in Section 3.3 below—it would need to be
presented visually to the parties it is meant to bind.
Institutional concerns. In addition to technical concerns, many interviewees
claimed that the RPA was causing institutional friction sufficient to delay or prevent
RPKI adoption. Network engineers within some organizations state that they are
wary of entering into the RPA out of fear of running afoul of their organizations’
procurement rules.
ARIN’s efforts to date. In response to both the technical and institutional
concerns raised by members, ARIN has devoted significant resources (in terms of
employee and board time, along with expenditures on legal counsel) to refine the RPA
consent process. As early as 2014, NANOG participants raised concerns over some of
the clauses to the agreement and over the fact that ARIN had structured the
agreement as “clickwrap”—a term for legal agreements that require affirmative
assent via a mouse-click. In response to these concerns, ARIN reviewed its approach

See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that actual
knowledge of a browsewrap agreement sufficed to establish assent). To the extent a court were to apply
Virginia law in analyzing the question of assent, constructive knowledge might also be statutorily
established through application of Virginia’s Computer Information Transactions Act. See VA. CODE
§ 59.1-504.6(b) (establishing the effectiveness of disclaimers of warranties placed in information
records). It is far from clear, however, that choice-of-law doctrine would lead most courts to apply
Virginia law. Choice-of-law analysis will often be case-specific and driven by a particular court’s
evaluation and balancing of multiple factors. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 188; id. § 199 (calling for application of § 188 to “determine the formalities required to make a valid
contract”). As a result, ARIN is justified in preparing for the application of the laws of any state with
significant connections to RPKI’s users.
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to offering the RPKI repository to third parties21 and decided in February 2016 to
restructure the agreement into the “browsewrap” described above.22 This change
obviated the need for end users to make an affirmative mouse-click explicitly
accepting the terms and conditions contained in the RPA before accessing ARIN’s
TAL. According to multiple interviewees, this change resulted in increased
willingness among some network engineers to make use of the Repository, as entering
into browsewrap agreements falls within their understanding of their authority to
act unilaterally within their organizations.
This change did not, however, address the perceived problem for all potential
users. Many network engineers are not allowed to enter into the RPA browsewrap
agreement unilaterally. That is because their corporate procurement policies prohibit
employees from entering into agreements that contain indemnification clauses and
other terms not seen in standard licenses without first subjecting those agreements
to internal review. These internal review processes require network engineers to
invest time in navigating corporate bureaucracy to try out things like RPKI. Internal
bureaucracy can be valuable to ensuring that all parts of an organization (for
instance, engineering and legal) are on the same page about a new endeavor and any
related risks that arise from new dependencies on external services, but they also
make new endeavors more time-consuming to undertake.
Some interviewees further stated that the indemnification clause in ARIN’s
RPA exceeds what their organizations would be willing to accept to participate in
ROV. This claim has been hard to vet. On the one hand, some interviewees have
stated that their legal departments viewed the indemnification clause as too strict.
Further, there may be a large cohort of non-North-American network operators that
lack the capacity to assess a legal agreement written in English. On the other hand,
the fact that all ARIN members have signed a Registration Services Agreement
(“RSA,” described in more detail in Section 4.1 below) that contains an
indemnification clause that is substantially similar to the RPA’s indemnification
clause, suggests that indemnification is not a deal-breaker for those organizations,
which include many of the most significant networks on the Internet. Rather, it is a
weight on the scale in operators’ decision-making processes. Our interviews with legal
personnel have corroborated the view that indemnification is not typically an
automatic deal-breaker, but rather acts as a weight on the scale. In the end, however,
every organization will approach the question of indemnification in its own way.
On the basis of all these considerations, we draw three conclusions. First, due
to institutional factors, the RPA’s indemnification clause poses a nontrivial barrier to
participation in ROV. Second, engineers interested in participating in ROV can and
should engage their appropriate internal processes to evaluate ARIN’s RPA in its
See, e.g., John Curran, President and CEO of ARIN, & Steve Ryan, Counsel to ARIN, RPKI Relying
Party
Agreement
(RPA)
Change
(Jan.
2016),
available
at
https://www.arin.net/vault/about_us/bot/20160111/exhibit_c.pdf.
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See John Curran, President and CEO of ARIN, Change re ARIN RPKI Relying Party TAL Access,
NANOG MAILING LIST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016February/084042.html.
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current form, and as it may evolve over time. Finally, as we discuss below, ARIN
should continue to consider ways to improve RPA acceptance, including by
considering changes to the RPA’s terms to make them more acceptable to reticent
parties.
3.3 Reforming Direct Access
Framing the question of reform. Given the reality that the RPA—and
specifically its indemnification clause—alters the institutional calculus for network
engineers considering whether to engage in ROV, should ARIN and its members
consider removing the RPA, revising the indemnification clause, or trying other
potential solutions?
In deciding how best to structure legal limitations on access to the ARIN
Repository, it is necessary to frame the proper goal. One sensible goal for the Internet
community, as discussed above, is widespread distribution of RPKI repository
information. Another goal, of course, is to ensure the ongoing stability and soundness
of ARIN—a crucial organization in North America’s Internet governance. The RPA
protects ARIN from undue liability, so any proposal to change it or eliminate it should
be approached with caution.
Plainly, these two goals are sometimes in tension. Though some RPKI
advocates would wish for RPKI information to flow completely freely, the wisdom of
that approach cannot be assumed a priori. RIRs have important interests—in proper
Repository use and appropriate allocation of liability for misuse, for example—that
reasonably inform how they offer their TALs to potential users.
By the same token, for an RIR interested in supporting RPKI adoption,
complete insulation from potential legal risks is not a feasible goal. Any organization
that takes productive action in society cannot completely eliminate the risk of liability
or of having to defend against lawsuits—even frivolous ones over entirely legitimate
conduct. Instead, the proper objective for an RIR is to balance the risks of incurring
legal costs against the benefits of engaging in activities that further the
organization’s goals. This means that legal protection is an exercise in optimization
and appropriate allocation of risk, not necessarily maximization of legal protections.
The uncertain bounds of potential liability. When it comes to distribution
of RPKI repositories, striking the proper balance between potential benefits and risks
must take place amid conditions of uncertainty. RPKI is a new service, and we know
of no lawsuits dealing with the proper apportionment of the potential sources of
liability associated with it. Furthermore, the exact harm scenarios will shift both with
increased deployment and as new uses for RPKI information develop. Each RIR and
relying party must therefore evaluate its legal risk based on its own best assessment
of how RPKI usage might go wrong and where their liability might lie and weigh
those risks against the potential benefits of broader RPKI deployment. RIRs and
relying parties can gain additional perspective into potential liability from RPKI
failure by drawing comparisons to other situations where providers of similar types
of trusted information have been subject to legal claims.
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Framing the harm scenarios. At its root, an RPKI repository is a body of
information. It holds information necessary to conduct ROV, including Resource
Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and signed objects (including, most
importantly, ROAs). Though RIRs currently publish the leading RPKI repositories,
they are not the sole creators of the information contained within them. To the
contrary, much of the most important information—specifically, the ROAs pertaining
to specific locations—can be produced only by the parties that hold private keys
pertaining to specific IP address space.
Providers of information might face claims under a number of different legal
theories. In the case of RPKI, scenarios giving rise to a legal claim include incidents
that make it impossible or difficult for traffic to reach an Internet endpoint and
incidents that allow traffic to pass into unwanted hands. How might a repository
provider like ARIN be implicated in such incidents? Given RPKI’s limited track
record, it is impossible to be certain, but we conjecture that an aggrieved party might
accuse ARIN of failing to issue private keys to IP address holders in a proper manner,
facilitating the issuance of faulty ROAs (whether through administrative error or
security failure), or improperly revoking private keys or ROAs. Aggrieved parties
might include network operators, and they might also include downstream customers
whose traffic has been disrupted or misdirected.
One obvious scenario worth considering is how downstream users of RPKI
information might react if an RIR’s repository were to temporarily become
unavailable. This is not fanciful: RIRs’ repositories have gone down in the past,23 and
no amount of diligence can completely eliminate the possibility of similar temporary
outages in the future. To date, these have had little impact on Internet traffic. That
may be because networks that utilize ROV find it easy and sensible to adopt best
practices that respond gracefully to outages and similar problems. But it also may be
because RPKI is in such early stages of deployment. If some future downstream users
are unprepared to handle the occasional outage—a possibility that can never be
completely precluded—then misconfigurations could, under certain circumstances,
lead to traffic disruptions once RPKI ROV is widely in use.24 In such a situation, an
RIR might be accused of contributing to the misfortune, even despite the requirement
for relying parties to utilize best practices in their use of RPKI information.
Though the magnitudes and precise harm scenarios vary, every provider of a
trusted information service used to direct Internet traffic faces risks of this type of
accusation. Their examples can help inform RIR policy. For instance, Internet
participants use cryptographic Transport Layer Security (“TLS”) certificates to
See, e.g., Mark Kosters, ARIN Chief Technology Officer, ARIN RPKI Repository (Update), ARIN (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.arin.net/announcements/2018/20181024_update.html (describing an ARIN
RPKI service issue); RIPE NCC RPKI Repository Outage, RIPE NCC (Feb. 3, 2013),
https://www.ripe.net/support/service-announcements/service-announcements/ripe-ncc-rpkirepository-outage (describing a RIPE NCC RPKI repository outage).
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It is worth noting that, at present, even network operators who are already using RPKI today are
not perfect at doing so. See, e.g., Nusenu, Cleaning Up ROAs Inconsistent with the BGP State, APNIC
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://blog.apnic.net/2018/10/16/cleaning-up-roas-inconsistent-with-the-bgp-state/.
24

16

secure application-layer communications. Similarly, parties use the Domain Name
System Security Extensions (“DNSSEC”) to ensure cryptographic origin validation of
data when resolving DNS queries. Finally, many network operators currently use
IRR information to support their route filtering decisions. These services thus provide
examples that, though imperfectly analogous, are relevant to an RPKI repository
provider’s risk analysis.
We are not aware of a case in U.S. state or federal court involving allegations
of operational harm based on faulty provision of TLS, Secure Socket Layer (“SSL,”
TLS’s predecessor), IRR, or DNSSEC information. That does not mean that
providers of key information within these systems are immune from liability (or
that they have not settled claims outside of public view), just that no such case has
yet been litigated. Thus, an inquiry into the bounds of a repository provider’s
liability should also look to analogies to other forms of trusted information. These
include maps, financial records and reports, medical information, and the like. Once
a (necessarily rough) estimate of liability risk is made, it can then inform an
assessment of different paths of action. As discussed below, the inquiry should look
at legal techniques to insulate certificate repository providers from liability that do
not involve indemnification. These include the use of disclaimers of warranties and
liability, express statements that users are assuming various risks, and disclosures
that services are being provided on an “as is” basis. The inquiry should also consider
whether the net value of dropping the RPA exceeds its potential costs in terms of
liability risk.
The unlikelihood of strict products liability. The most serious fear for any
provider of information is that they might be held liable for harm under a doctrine
called “strict liability.” Strict liability refers to the imposition of legal responsibility
for harm, even where the liable party acted with reasonable care in a transaction.
This doctrine is unlikely to be applied to providers of RPKI repositories. The
primary reason for this is that strict liability applies to harms involving products, not
services. For the most part, information suppliers have been deemed to fall outside
the sweep of strict products liability because they are providing services.
Even in the unlikely event that an RPKI repository were deemed to be a
product, rather than a service, the application of strict products liability typically
requires a finding that a given product has been distributed in a defective condition.
To be deemed defective, a product must fail to meet reasonable consumer
expectations regarding safety or fail a test pitting the utility of investment in safety
against the risks of failing to deploy an available safety measure (also known as the
risk-utility calculus). Assuming an RIR adhered to IETF standards, it would be
unlikely that a court would find its RPKI materials to be defective under either
standard.
While courts have applied strict products liability to information providers in
rare cases involving the sellers of defective aeronautical charts, such cases are far
afield from likely scenarios involving RPKI. In those cases, publishers had made
precise misrepresentations that were causally linked to deadly plane crashes. The
reliance of users on the precise details of the maps could not have been more serious
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or direct. In contrast, occasional problems with specific elements of RPKI information
are to be expected and are likely to be resolved through various backup mechanisms.
Harms are likely to be less serious than a plane crash, and there are many best
practices that network operators should be implementing to prevent bad outcomes in
the case of RPKI outages or misconfigurations. As a result, the most plausible factual
scenarios involving RPKI failures are unlikely to tempt courts or juries into applying
strict products liability to the provision of RPKI repositories.
The possibility of negligence liability. While the application of strict
products liability is quite unlikely, the application of doctrines concerning negligence
is possible. For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts—a respected, though
nonauthoritative, source on central matters of legal doctrine—identifies
“[i]nformation [n]egligently [s]upplied for the [g]uidance of [o]thers” as a core kind of
negligent misrepresentation.25 An allegation of this kind of negligence might, under
the right circumstances, be asserted against an RPKI repository provider with some
degree of plausibility. Similar claims might allege other forms of negligence, such as
negligent hiring and supervision of personnel tasked with operating an RIR’s RPKI
facilities. To be victorious, a claimant would need to establish that (i) the provider
had a duty to act with a certain level of care with regard to a given aspect of RPKI
repository-provision; (ii) the provider breached that duty; (iii) the breach actually and
proximately caused a resulting injury; and (iv) that injury resulted in cognizable
harm.
The risk of negligence liability is mitigated by a number of factors. First, it is
highly likely that RIRs will act with the requisite level of care in providing RPKI
information. They are competent institutions, and if they adhere to the practices and
procedures developed by the Internet community with regard to RPKI, they will likely
avoid liability for negligence. Second, the law often prevents parties that acted
negligently themselves from recovering for negligent misrepresentation. Any party
utilizing RPKI information—for instance in making route-filtering decisions—would
themselves be held to a standard of care based on a reasonable network operator’s
approach to such activities and would have to follow established best practices in
order to prevail. Third, to the extent claims are brought by parties in privity, courts
are likely to uphold limitations on consequential damages like the one found in
ARIN’s RPA. Fourth, to the extent that claims could be brought by downstream
customers of networks utilizing RPKI information, the liability of an RIR would likely
be cabined by the doctrine of proximate cause and by doctrines limiting recovery in
negligence for pure economic loss.
Nevertheless, negligence liability is still a reasonable concern. The probability
and magnitude of such liability is, in the end, uncertain. Despite the fact that network
operators should be using best practices to ensure that RPKI outages do not cause
downstream harms, it is of course possible that some operators will not follow best
practices. In such cases, a harmed party may attempt to sue ARIN alongside their
25
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network provider. The questions generated by negligence claims are often hard to
resolve, and this means that the question of legal risk is not cut and dried. Questions
about particular breaches of duty and the vagaries of causation often generate knotty
questions of fact, particularly when it comes to highly technical matters.
Furthermore, even defending against claims that ultimately prove unsuccessful can
still be costly—especially when questions of fact are involved. Lawyers’ services are
not free. As a result, our analysis proceeds on the premise that the costs of negligence
suits—including defense against ultimately unsuccessful claims—are something that
RIRs should consider. Though our analysis below explores the possibility of
eliminating the RPA altogether, we believe that the ultimate uncertainty about
potential negligence claims makes it reasonable for ARIN to retain its RPA as well.
Further, though we recommend ARIN and its members consider rebalancing the
current allocation of risk by removing, or at least revising, the RPA’s indemnification
clause, the ultimate uncertainty about potential negligence claims again suggests
that reasonable minds can disagree about how far to go in this regard.
Dropping the RPA as a strategy to promote RPKI. When distributing an
RPKI repository, should an RIR require a relying party to enter into an agreement at
all? This was a central question raised by many interviewees. Interviewees noted that
three of the five RIRs enable access to their RPKI repositories without placing them
behind an explicit relying party agreement like ARIN’s RPA.26 Similarly, the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”) does not require an RPA for its DNS Root
Zone Trust Anchors27; relying parties are unlikely to be bound by anything like an
RPA in the TLS context28; and ARIN itself does not require an RPA for parties that

These RIRs are the African Network Information Centre (“AfriNIC”), the Asia-Pacific Network
Information Centre (“APNIC”), and LACNIC. See, e.g., RIPE NCC, rpki-validator, supra note 16, at
lines 140-155. Of these RIRs, APNIC publishes a document that purports to establish a contractual
relationship between APNIC and the recipients of RPKI certificates, but that document is unclear as
to its application to relying parties. The ultimate legal status and coverage of that document is beyond
the scope of this report but has been a topic of community discussion. See Edward Dore, Freethought
Internet, ARIN RPKI TAL Deployment Issues, NANOG MAILING LIST (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-October/097543.html. We are counting RIPE NCC’s
Certification Repository Terms and Conditions as an explicit RPA-style agreement. See RIPE NCC
Certification
Repository
Terms
and
Conditions,
RIPE
NCC
(Sept.
30,
2016),
https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/certification/legal/ripe-ncccertification-repository-terms-and-conditions [hereinafter “RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms
and Conditions”]. It is beyond the scope of this report whether that agreement would be legally binding
as to all parties who access the RIPE NCC TAL.
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See Trust Anchors and Keys, IANA, available at https://www.iana.org/dnssec/files (last visited Dec.
27, 2018).
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See Steven B. Roosa & Stephen Schultze, The “Certificate Authority” Trust Model for SSL: A
Defective Foundation for Encrypted Web Traffic and a Legal Quagmire, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J.
3, 6-7 (2010) (discussing documents “purport[ing] to be . . . agreement[s] between the CA and the
relying party/end user” and stating that “[t]he end user’s assent to these standard documents is
generally neither obtained nor sought”).
28
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utilize its IRR information.29 Interviewees suggested that the value of North
American ROAs would vastly improve if ARIN opted for a similar agreement-free
path in the RPKI context. This is because parties worldwide would have an easier,
less legalistic path to conducting ROV on routes covered by those ROAs. In turn, this
would increase the value of route-signing in North America.
We think the RPA-free path is worth consideration. This is because an
agreement-free distribution would enable the ARIN Repository to circulate more
widely than it does at present. To be sure, ARIN would lose legal protection by doing
so. But if one believes that the likelihood of serious harms from RPKI
misconfigurations, outages, and accidents is very low, then one should be sanguine
about losing that protection. The loss of protection would enable wider ROV for North
American-originated routes, and it would also enable open-source software
developers to automate the installation of validator software that covered all five
global regions. Examples of agreement-free distribution in other contexts are
suggestive, if imperfect, evidence that such a path would be reasonable for ARIN to
consider.30
However, there are risk-reward tradeoffs that are also worth considering. One
of these tradeoffs has to do with the allocation of liability and responsibility for
potential problems stemming from repository use. We concluded above that it is
ultimately uncertain whether RPKI repository providers might face claims of
negligence that have some plausibility. At the very least, they might have to expend
resources defending against ultimately unwarranted allegations. Judgments about
the seriousness of these risks might differ, given the relative novelty of RPKI and the
range of possible applications of the law. Certainly, we cannot rule out the risk of
See ARIN’s Internet Routing Registry (IRR), ARIN, https://www.arin.net/resources/routing/ (last
visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter “ARIN IRR”].
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Any comparisons of the probabilities and magnitudes of legal risk between RPKI providers, IRR
providers, the DNS Root Zone Trust Anchor provider, and TLS providers are inevitably fraught with
difficulty. This is due to the near-complete absence of public legal disputes involving their provision.
Nevertheless, we may hazard some comparisons. First, IRR is only partially analogous to RPKI. This
is due to the fact that there are many publishers of IRR information, whereas RIRs serve (by design)
as exclusive publishers of RPKI information for their regions. As a result, any failure or accident
involving an RPKI publisher is covered by less redundancy than is present for IRR. In contrast, the
risks posed by a failure or accident involving IANA’s DNS functions could pose similarly significant
downstream ramifications as an RPKI failure or accident. As a result, the fact that IANA continues to
publish its Root Zone Trust Anchors without requiring an RPA is instructive in the RPKI context.
Finally, the case of TLS certificate authorities (“CAs”) is mixed. Failures or accidents on the part of
CAs can lead to website unavailability, but such incidents are usually resolved by end users who route
around the problem. In some cases, legal risk that, in principle, might be shouldered by CAs is passed
onto browser and operating-system vendors via indemnification clauses, though this is not a universal
practice. As a result of this diversity, it is difficult to draw direct lessons for RPKI from the TLS context.
In any event, as noted above, despite periodic problems with TLS (and, prior to TLS, SSL) certificateprovision, we are not aware of any court cases adjudicating responsibility for end-user harm.
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Stepping back, it is worth noting that all of this discussion happens against the backdrop of widelyknown best practices for mitigating failures and accidents among upstream service-providers. Harms
are most likely to arise when downstream parties have failed to adopt best practices.
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legal costs. To mitigate this risk through legal design (in addition to efforts to mitigate
risk through investment in service-level quality), there are two broad strategies that
an RIR might pursue. The first of these is the one currently pursued by ARIN: the
use of an RPA. The second of these is for an RIR to spin off a special-purpose legal
entity solely for the provision of RPKI information. The latter approach might enable
an RPA-free distribution even in the face of legal risks.
Contract as a strategy for limiting legal risk. The RPA can mitigate much
of the legal risk posed by RPKI provision. That is because contract clauses that
explicitly limit liability and establish that the agreeing party assumes various risks
often suffice to defeat negligence claims (and similar claims of breach of implied
warranties) asserted by parties to the agreement. For instance, in Virginia, the
jurisdiction whose law the RPA selects to govern disputes, courts have admitted
contract clauses as evidence of the express assumption of risk by a party participating
in a risky activity. Virginia courts also honor clauses limiting liability in some
circumstances. Finally, Virginia law tends to allow parties to disclaim liability for a
counterparty’s consequential damages in transactions like the RIR-relying party
transaction. It is reasonably likely that courts would uphold similar clauses found in
the RPA. Such clauses—analogous to the “as-is” license language that typically
accompanies open-source software—enable a service provider to bind direct
counterparties to a contractual allocation of risks.
The value of such terms depends on the seriousness of the risks against which
they defend compared with the costs they impose on the organizational mission.
ARIN’s RPA contains terms that seek to limit liability and allocate risks, suggesting
ARIN favors a cautious approach to liability risk. RIPE NCC follows a similar
approach. Its Certification Repository Terms and Conditions state that users employ
the RIPE NCC repository at their “own risk” and that RIPE NCC “is in no way liable
for direct or indirect damages” stemming from activities involving the repository.31
As noted above, other RIRs have opted not to require an agreement by relying parties.
Ultimately, the decision is a matter of judgment, and both using and foregoing
an agreement are reasonable choices for an RIR and its community members. While
ARIN would be on sound footing adopting the approach of the three RIRs that offer
their TALs without placing it behind an agreement, we view it as reasonable for ARIN
to maintain their RPA for the purpose of contractually limiting liability and
establishing that relying parties assume various risks of using the Repository
information, which is likely to cut off some of ARIN’s legal risk. As noted above, in
order to make the RPA effective, ARIN would need to continue presenting the
agreement visually to users of the RPKI repository. This would require software
developers to build manual RPA-acceptance processes into their validator software
packages—a deviation from typical methods of automated open-source software
installation, but not uncommon in software installation more broadly.

31

RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions, supra note 26, at art. 4.
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Corporate separation as a strategy for limiting legal risk. There are
clear trade-offs to dropping the RPA, and to revising it. For this reason, it may be
valuable for the North American Internet community to consider creating a separate
corporate entity that would be responsible for the operational aspects of RPKI
repository provision.
Why might a new organization be worth considering? At present, the reason
why ARIN requires its relying parties to sign an RPA is to ensure that legal liability—
even if unlikely—does not threaten the broader mission of the organization. If ARIN
were to divest itself of the repository-provision side of RPKI and instead contract with
a separate entity to publish a trustworthy repository, it would no longer bear direct
legal risk related to outages. The new organization in charge of operating the RPKI
repository would then be in a position to make its own decisions regarding how much
legal risk to bear vis-à-vis relying parties. Because it would not have other functions
that it would have to safeguard, it might see fit to bear more legal risk, such as by
eliminating the RPA altogether. Assuming ARIN’s transfer of responsibilities did not
run afoul of legal rules that pass liability through to associated entities, ARIN itself
would no longer bear legal risk from repository operation. The two organizations
could coordinate via contract regarding RPKI operations. The corporate structures
(i.e., boards, procedures) would have to be designed and observed to ensure
separateness between the two entities.
Of course, there are many aspects of corporate separation that are beyond the
scope of this report, but which would affect the viability of the proposal. At this stage,
we recommend that corporate separation be considered alongside other methods of
reducing legal barriers to RPKI adoption. It should be discussed by ARIN and the
Internet community in the coming months, as dialogue on RPKI progresses.
The benefits and costs of forgoing indemnification. Let us now set aside
the idea of corporate separation and turn back to the RPA. If ARIN determines that
it is appropriate to maintain the RPA, it may still be valuable to remove (or, in the
alternative, revise) the RPA’s indemnification clause in favor of an “as is” disclaimer
of warranties.
What does the indemnification clause do? At its root, indemnification requires
the relying party to bear the burden of various costs associated with a covered set of
legal risks. In case of the RPA, the covered set of legal risks is expansive. The RPA’s
indemnification clause covers “any and all claims” that are “asserted by a third party
in connection with” two types of events—(i) the use of RPKI information and services
or (ii) the breach of the RPA’s terms.32 The clause covers situations where the use or
breach was by the relying party or by any “[a]ssociated [p]ersons,” such as customers
or clients.33
Specifically, “any and all claims, demands, disputes, actions, suits, proceedings, judgments,
damages, injuries, losses, expenses, costs and fees (including reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses),
interest, fines and penalties of whatever nature.” ARIN RPA, supra note 14, at § 7.
32
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In such a situation, what would the relying party owe to ARIN? The key terms
of ARIN’s indemnification agreement—“indemnify, defend, and hold harmless”—
impose distinct responsibilities.34 First, the duty to “indemnify” would require the
relying party to pay for a covered set of losses suffered by ARIN after they were
established through a legal process. Separately, the “duty to defend” would require
the relying party to cover the ARIN’s “expense of defending suits” alleging harm from
covered activities.35 Finally, some courts would treat the obligation to “hold harmless”
as a right of ARIN to be released from suit brought by the relying party.
This clause provides benefits to ARIN in terms of reducing legal risk.
Indemnity insulates ARIN from the monetary costs of adverse legal outcomes. And
even before such an outcome might come to fruition, the “duty to defend” would
require a relying party to cover the costs of legal defense of all claims falling within
its scope. This right to defense would be available to ARIN early in litigation—before
a court reached the merits of an underlying suit. As a result, it would allow ARIN to
avoid litigation costs associated with even meritless claims brought against it.
At the same time, some interviewees regarded the RPA’s indemnification
clause as a barrier to RPKI adoption. This is due in part to its mere existence and
due in part to its particular terms. Recall that many organizations require formalized
review of any agreement containing an indemnification clause. This costs time and
deters network engineers from proposing RPKI within their organizations. The
clause’s terms are also more stringent than some organizations would likely accept
for the purpose of participating in RPKI as early adopters. In particular, the clause
as currently drafted is quite broad: it requires relying parties to indemnify ARIN even
for its own negligence. Interviewees noted that they were wary of binding their
organizations to defend and indemnify ARIN for such a broad swath of activity.
Further, they stated they were wary of indemnifying ARIN when the value of RPKI
is unclear and when they were unsure of ARIN’s investments to ensure that RPKI
functions reliably on a day-to-day basis. These factors have deterred a number of
potential adoptees from advancing RPKI within their organizations.
Some interviewees suggested that the publication of more materials like
ARIN’s Certificate Practices Statement and further outreach to members might allay
their concerns about indemnification. Others suggested that the clause be revised or
deleted from the RPA.
How should ARIN and its members evaluate the indemnification clause issue?
It poses a tradeoff between the legal risk-reduction benefits of the clause and the drag
it creates on RPKI adoption. The risk-reduction function of the indemnification clause
is only relevant to the extent ARIN is likely to face legal risk for incidents involving
RPKI. Though this risk is difficult to estimate, two factors suggest it is not grave.
First, as discussed above, the RPA’s disclaimer of warranties and liability would
provide substantial (though certainly not total) protection against liability. Second,
34
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research has not revealed negligence suits involving comparable security
information, such as TLS (and its predecessor SSL), IRR, or DNSSEC. This absence
is suggestive, but it is not dispositive. If a widespread RPKI outage were to harm
many customers of ARIN’s relying parties, then the indemnification clause would
indeed protect it from serious legal risk. On the other side of the scale, the community
must weigh exactly how serious a block the indemnification clause is to their
organizations’ willingness to agree to the RPA. Our interviews suggest that it is
significant. Engineers seeking to adopt RPKI usually are doing so out of a sense that
the framework will benefit the entire community, including their organizations. But
the gains are not generally perceived to be so significant that they would justify
indemnifying ARIN for its own negligence.
Given these equities, the ARIN membership might consider asking ARIN to
drop the indemnification clause while maintaining clear disclaimers of warranties
and limitations of liability within the RPA. Doing so would eliminate the moral
hazard problem associated with having relying parties indemnify ARIN for its own
negligence. ARIN is the best-positioned party to reduce its own risk of acting
negligently and thus should certainly bear that burden. Further, ARIN is wellpositioned to reduce the ultimate risk of harm through investments in the quality of
its provision and through clear disclaimers applicable to relying parties. Though the
elimination of the indemnification clause would shift some legal costs from relying
parties to ARIN at the margin and may drive up ARIN’s insurance costs, the shift
would simultaneously remove a clear barrier to RPKI adoption. Notably, ARIN
already makes this tradeoff in some cases: it willingly drops the indemnification
clause for certain governmental counterparties (discussed in Section 3.4 below). This
suggests that the clause may not be strictly necessary.
Dropping the indemnification clause (while retaining disclaimers and
limitations on liability) would also bring ARIN closer to comparable RIRs on this
issue. ARIN is the only RIR that clearly imposes an indemnification clause as such
on repository access and is the only RIR to impose independent obligations to defend
or hold harmless. While RIPE NCC does disclaim liability,36 this falls short of
requiring that relying parties provide an affirmative promise to indemnify, defend,
and hold RIPE NCC harmless. AfriNIC and LACNIC, for their parts, appear not to
have comparable disclaimers of liability at all, let alone indemnification agreements.
All in all, ARIN places more burdens on its relying parties than do the other RIRs.
ARIN’s choice to impose an indemnification clause is also more burdensome
than approaches taken by IANA with regard to its DNS Root Trust Anchors,37 the
providers of the OpenSSL Toolkit,38 or ARIN’s approach to its Internet Routing
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Registry.39 To be sure, other security resources are provided against the backdrop of
indemnification clauses, as are many Internet services—including residential “last
mile” service.40 The Terms of Use for ARIN’s Whois Terms of Use, which network
operators likely encounter through their typical operations, also contain an
indemnification clause to which (at least to our knowledge) network operators have
not objected.41 Similarly, providers of DNS services require their users to indemnify
them.42 But all this is merely suggestive. The real question is one of ARIN’s own
optimization. Given the costs of the indemnification clause on ROV adoption and
ARIN’s ability to insulate itself from a significant bulk of liability risk through the
use of disclaimers and explicit statements of risks, dropping the clause in favor of an
“as is” disclaimer of warranties may be the best path, perhaps in conjunction with an
increase in insurance coverage to address residual risk of litigation costs.
In the alternative, ARIN should at least consider narrowing the clause
significantly, to remove the moral hazard problem arising from indemnification
applicable to its own negligence. Specifically, it could limit indemnification to
situations where a relying party or downstream customer of a relying party failed to
live up to a set of common best practices in relation to RPKI’s role in real-time routing
practices.
Such practices, of course, are essential to Internet security in a world of
widespread RPKI deployment, no matter the legal consequences.43 Collaborative
efforts that publicize best practices, such as the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing
Security (“MANRS”),44 therefore serve a dual purpose of promoting RPKI adoption
directly and reducing the chances of RPKI-related incidents turning into legal issues.
These chances are likely low already, but the more investment that network
operators put into best practices, the lower they become.
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3.4 Direct Access by Governmental Entities
In addition to the general issues surrounding direct access to the ARIN RPKI
repository, interviewees also raised issues specifically applicable to government
entities. These have to do with terms in the RPA that government agencies regard as
problematic. First, federal procurement law prohibits federal actors from
authoritatively agreeing to the RPA’s indemnification clause.45 Second, under some
circumstances, federal agencies are discouraged from agreeing to alternative dispute
resolution procedures like arbitration.46 Third, similar prohibitions operate at the
state and local level and also sometimes forbid accepting agreements that specify the
choice of law outside the state in which the governmental entity sits.47 A number of
interviewees stated that the presence of indemnification and choice-of-law clauses in
the RPA were gating issues that prevented them from considering ROV.
This set of barriers is easily resolved. ARIN already has adopted a policy of
modifying both clauses for governmental entities to the extent necessary to comply
with applicable law or regulations.48 This policy eliminates the concerns raised by
interviewees about governmental entity access, although it would be valuable for
ARIN and its members to publicize this policy more broadly and to inform the
community of which government agencies that have previously received waivers or
modifications of the problematic clauses.

The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits government employees from authoritatively agreeing on behalf of
the government to “unrestricted, open-ended indemnification agreement[s]” like the one in ARIN’s
RPA. See The Anti-Deficiency Act Implications of Consent by Government Employees to Online Terms
of Service Agreements Containing Open-Ended Indemnification Clauses, 36 Op. O.L.C. at 1, 2012 WL
5885535 (Mar. 27, 2012), available at https://www.justice.gov/file/20596/download (“A government
employee with actual authority to contract on behalf of the United States violates the Anti-Deficiency
Act by entering into an unrestricted, open-ended indemnification agreement on behalf of the
government. A government employee who lacks authority to contract on behalf of the United States
does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act by consenting to an agreement, including an agreement
containing an unrestricted, open-ended indemnification clause, because no binding obligation on the
government was incurred.”).
45

46

See 5 U.S.C. § 572(b).

See, e.g., 1 CAL. STATE CONTRACTING MANUAL § 7.86 (2017), available at
http://www.dgs.ca.gov/Portals/32/Users/141/25/3725/8%20Pages%20from%20SCM%20June%2020173.pdf (prohibiting agreement to indemnification clauses); Katherine A. Adams, Contract Law for State
Purchasing
Officers
§
III.G
(Sept.
23,
2013),
available
at
https://www.naepnet.org/resource/collection/A9EC9928-E0AA-4604-85AE28941F4BE73C/Contracting_101_Handbook.docx (discussing rules governing choice of law clauses for
Kentucky government entities).
47

See
Registration
Services
Agreement
(RSA)
FAQ,
ARIN,
https://www.arin.net/resources/agreements/rsa_faq.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter
“ARIN RSA FAQ”].
48

26

3.5 Legal Barriers to Indirect Use
Beyond directly downloading an RPKI repository from an RIR or via a thirdparty software tool to conduct their own ROV, network operators may also benefit
from using RPKI repository materials as inputs to support more complete services.
For instance, services are emerging that use RPKI information to clean up IRRs.
Others combine RPKI information, IRR information, and other inputs to create
dynamic route-filtering advice for end users. Many of these services are being offered
by third-party providers. End users employing these emerging services do not
necessarily need to access the RIR RPKI repositories directly to benefit from RPKI.
The same is true with services that translate RPKI ROAs into IRR objects and with
public monitoring projects, such as Certificate Transparency reporting. This Section
discusses legal barriers to the development of software and services that enable the
indirect use of RPKI information.
The prohibited conduct clause. The major barrier to the development of
indirect RPKI uses is the “prohibited conduct” clause in ARIN’s RPA. This clause
states that information derived from the ARIN Repository may be made available to
third parties only “so long as such use and disclosure is solely for informational
purposes, namely reporting, educational, summary or statistical purposes, and such
use and disclosure of the information is not in a readily machine-readable format.”49
This imposes limit on parties’ authority to redistribute the repository or to circulate
information that uses the information contained in the repository as an input.
The benefits of the prohibited conduct clause. The prohibited conduct
clause is intended to protect ARIN against liability for accidents involving certain
uses of its repository information. Consider the following hypothetical situation.
Imagine that a party relying directly on information obtained from ARIN’s RPKI
repository simply redistributed that information free of any agreement to anyone who
asked for it. This could potentially open up ARIN to exactly the kinds of tort claims
(discussed in Section 3.3 above) against which the RPA is designed to protect. The
prohibited conduct clause defends against this hypothetical by placing the onus on
relying parties to ensure that all users using information that they download from
the ARIN RPKI repository are bound by the RPA. Unfortunately, it also impedes
third-party RPKI offerings.
The costs of the prohibited conduct clause. Multiple interviewees stated
that the prohibited conduct clause is an impediment to important software- and
service-development efforts for RPKI. Recall that RPKI deployment presents a
chicken-and-egg problem, where the value of issuing ROAs depends on the extent to
which networks filter based on invalid and unsigned routes. Given that reality, the
development of “turnkey” validation support services will remove important barriers
to the deployment of ROV filtering. As noted above, ARIN took an important step in
49
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reducing the legal barriers to such development when it announced that third-party
software developers could incorporate acceptance of the RPA into their software
packages. This means that open-source validation packages like RIPE NCC’s can now
build the process of downloading ARIN’s TAL directly into their workflow if they so
choose. However, the prohibited conduct clause still prohibits would-be providers
from selling or giving away services that include information derived from the ARIN
Repository presented in common formats like JavaScript Object Notation (“JSON”)
or Comma-Separated Values (“CSV”) or domain-specific protocols like RPKI-Router.
(For instance, a router vendor might operate a ROA cache and enable a turnkey ROV
configuration option within its routers.) These prohibitions make it harder than
necessary to design useful RPKI-based services. They also block the emergence of
service providers that would be most likely to promote best practices for RPKI usage.
Enabling indirect use. Given those costs, ARIN should consider altering the
prohibited conduct clause to facilitate third-party RPKI system development. In
addition to the beneficial step already taken by ARIN to support third-party
validation software, we suggest two further strategies for reform. First, ARIN might
consider allowing distribution of services making use of RPKI information as an input
on the condition that they require users to accept the RPA or an appropriate variant
of it for the use case involved. This would be quite similar to the allowance ARIN has
made for designers of validation software, but it would extend to more robust service
providers. Alternatively, ARIN could require these robust service providers to protect
ARIN via an intended third-party beneficiary clause.50 This is a common
arrangement used in many analogous settings, including free and open-source
software,51 and if drafted well, can be reliably expected to be upheld in court.52 ARIN
should evaluate such approaches and consider whether to enable them on a
permissionless or permissioned basis.
Second, ARIN should also consider revising its prohibition on distributing
information in “machine-readable format.” Even if ARIN does not wish to enable
wholesale redistribution of its actual RPKI repository, it should still support broader
distribution of information created with RPKI as an input for research and analysis
purposes. Crucially, such information is far more valuable when in machine-readable
format, because it enables sophisticated analysis and trendspotting. To strike a better
balance, ARIN may wish to rephrase the clause to prohibit using repository data for
purposes other than supporting operational RPKI ROV functionality. RIPE NCC, for
instance, forbids using its Repository data for “identification purposes, advertising,
direct marketing, marketing research or similar purposes.”53 A tailored prohibition
along those lines would enable active community members to share their RPKI
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analyses in computable formats without fearing retribution. Alternatively, ARIN
could explicitly allow machine-readable distribution for specific research and analysis
purposes.
4. ROUTE ORIGIN AUTHORIZATION
This Section turns from ROV-based filtering to Resource Certification access
and ROA-signing. Without active signing of ROAs, there would not be any useful
information to support ROV. As a result, it is necessary for RIRs to encourage IP
address space holders to obtain the cryptographic keys that enable them to sign ROAs
and then use those keys to begin doing precisely that. This Section discusses the legal
issues that interviewees flagged as potential hindrances to access to, and active use
of, RPKI keys. It is motivated by the objective of ensuring broad access to RPKI keys,
consistent with reasonable allocation of risks and duties among stakeholders.
4.1 Background
At present, the entire RPKI system is anchored in trusted allocations of RPKI
private keys to parties that are authorized to originate routing announcements for
particular IP address spaces. The responsibility for authorization is held by each RIR.
Holders of IP space administered by ARIN must sign two agreements to receive
access to the private keys that enable the issuance of ROAs. First, entities that wish
to sign ROAs must sign either an RSA if they received their IP addresses after ARIN
was created or a Legacy Registration Services Agreement (“LRSA”) if they obtained
their IP addresses before ARIN came into existence. The RSA and LRSA (which now
contain identical terms) cover the entire scope of a relationship between ARIN and a
member, including RPKI. Second, IP address holders that wish to sign ROAs must
sign an RPKI Terms of Service Agreement. This agreement covers specific aspects of
the ARIN-member relationship involving RPKI. Unlike the RPA, none of these
agreements is browsewrap. Instead, they are explicitly signed by parties that wish to
receive their RPKI keys.
Concerns raised by interviewees over these agreements are described and
evaluated in the Sections that follow. In Section 4.2, we address legal impediments
created by the LRSA. In Section 4.3, we address issues concerning governmental
access to Resource Certification.
4.2 Legacy Access
To receive the private keys that enable the issuance of ROAs for legacy address
space, entities must consent to ARIN’s LRSA.54 Many interviewees stated that this
requirement poses a barrier to RPKI adoption for legacy IP address holders. While
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some legacy address holders have overcome the barrier and chosen to sign ARIN’s
LRSA, others view it as prohibitive.
Perceived problems with the LRSA. Interviewees reported that the LRSA
might act as an impediment because of its terms—specifically, the requirement that
signatories to “acknowledge[] and agree[] that” they lack property rights in their IP
number resources.55 Some legacy resource holders view this as an unreasonable
concession due to their view that they hold rights that would be given away via such
an acknowledgment. They view themselves as the owners or legitimate controllers of
their legacy IP resources and do not want to run the risk of turning over any iota of
their present control to ARIN.
Assessing the cost of LRSA barrier. The perceived hindrance posed by the
LRSA’s clause regarding property rights is real, but it is difficult to measure its
impact. At present, the broader issue of legacy resource treatment is negatively
impacting the comparatively narrow and logically distinct issue of RPKI adoption.
Legacy resource holders that are interested in participating in RPKI but are
apprehensive about signing ARIN’s LRSA must decide which position they value
more. Anecdotal evidence indicates that multiple parties faced with that tradeoff
have opted to avoid RPKI. That is, the current linkage between the LRSA and RPKI
access likely is not driving legacy holders to sign the LRSA. Rather, it is turning them
away from RPKI.
It is worth exploring whether decoupling the issues could enable ARIN to
better serve its goal of driving RPKI participation while respecting the rights of its
full members and without reopening the contentious “property rights” issue. This
would be especially valuable in North America, where there is a higher concentration
of legacy IP holdings than in other regions. As a result, ARIN’s decision to tie the
RPKI to the LRSA poses a higher cost on RPKI adoption in North America than it
would in other regions.
We do not mean to overstate the importance of the LRSA. It is not clear
whether the LRSA is a “but-for” cause of non-adoption. At present, most network
operators that have signed LRSAs still have not deployed RPKI. The same is true for
the IPv6 address spaces held by IPv4 legacy resource holders that signed RSAs in
order to obtain their IPv6 address blocks. Lessening the perceived burden of the
LRSA would hardly be a silver bullet. In addition, transfers of legacy IP space
continue to reduce the set of legacy holders for whom the LRSA might be barrier.
Nevertheless, it would be valuable to remove the LRSA as a roadblock on the path to
widespread issuance of ROAs.
A potential path forward. To achieve more widespread ROA-issuance, ARIN
may wish to consider altering its approach to the “no property rights” clause. The key
role played by the “no property rights” clause in the LRSA is to create a structure
ARIN, Registration Services Agreement (LRSA: Version 4.0) § 7 (Aug. 16, 2016), available at
https://www.arin.net/resources/agreements/rsa.pdf.
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that enables ARIN to provide registration services to LRSA signatories under
conditions it sees as appropriate for operating its authoritative registry. The LRSA
gives a party “[t]he exclusive right to be the registrant” of a given address block, and
the “right to transfer the registration” within the ARIN registry under the terms of
ARIN’s governance.56 This set of rights is paired with the “no property rights” clause
concept to clearly establish ARIN’s control over how transfers and registrations take
place within its registry. One can think of the “no property rights” clause as one side
of a deal and the rights of registration and transfer as the other side.
ARIN and its members should consider whether to decouple that entire deal
from the RPKI Resource Certification process. That is, they should consider offering
a transactional pathway to obtaining RPKI private keys that neither requires a “no
property rights” admission, nor delivers any rights regarding registration or transfer
of IP space. By separating RPKI from the property rights controversy, ARIN would
open the RPKI door to LRSA holdouts. ARIN could adopt an at-will, fee-for-service
model for this pathway, in which ARIN protects all its other rights as put forth in the
normal LRSA. Further, this clause could contain a provision allowing termination
with explicit reversion to the status quo ante.
This would place ARIN closer to RIPE NCC and the Asia-Pacific Network
Information Centre (“APNIC”). Both have constructed multiple pathways to receive
RPKI services that do not require the signing of a full member services agreement.57
For RIPE NCC, these include the options of (i) signing a “non-member service
contract,” (ii) contracting with a sponsoring Local Internet Registry, and (iii) seeking
an accommodation for special circumstances.58 Each of these pathways separates the
question of access to RPKI keys from the broader question of a legacy resource
holder’s relationship with the RIR and requires those benefiting from RPKI services
to compensate the RIR for the costs of making them possible. Thus, entities wishing
to avoid an affirmative consent to the idea that they hold no property rights in
registered IP resources (something also contained in RIPE NCC’s Standard Services
Agreement)59 can opt for one of the alternate pathways.
Under a non-member service contract, legacy resource-holders could be
ushered into the RPKI fold without having to overcome their deep-seated opposition
to agreeing to the LRSA. In such a contract, ARIN could retain broad rights to deliver
or terminate RPKI services and support to parties unwilling to sign the LRSA. In
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essence, such a structure would give ARIN an ongoing option to deliver RPKI services
to non-signatories of the LRSA. This could help bring more participants into the ROA
process. The attractiveness of this approach would depend on the interest and
willingness of paid-in ARIN members to facilitate greater service-provision to those
not yet signed up.
4.3 Governmental Access to Resource Certification
As with access to the ARIN RPKI repository discussed in Section 3.4 above,
governmental entities have special concerns when it comes to accessing Resource
Certification. Both the RPKI Terms of Service and the RSA or LRSA contain
indemnification, arbitration, and choice of law clauses that may be outside the bounds
of an agency’s ability to contract. The solution here is identical to what was proposed
above: ARIN and the NANOG community should publicize ARIN’s policy of dropping
both clauses for governmental entities that are barred by law or regulation from
agreeing to them.60 ARIN should also present the RPKI Terms of Service to new
LRSA (and RSA) signatories during the member onboarding process. This would save
repeat visits between lawyers.
Our interviews indicate that governmental agencies also might view
themselves as prohibited by internal policy from disavowing property rights in their
legacy IP address allocations. The “non-member services” pathway to accessing RPKI
keys discussed in Section 4.2 above would help address this concern.
5. USING PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS TO PROMOTE ADOPTION
Beyond remedying explicit barriers to adoption, it is also possible to use other
legal mechanisms to affirmatively promote adoption. This Section discusses one such
mechanism: procurement requirements.
Procurement requirements are demands that large organizations place on
their suppliers. When a major corporation requires its outside law firms to have
certain forms of insurance or to engage in certain sustainability practices with their
office real estate, it acts as a significant force in the marketplace. The desire to tap
into these opportunities encourages more expansive use of insurance and
environmentally friendly building design and management.
Procurement requirements could also be a lever to promote RPKI. If a large
organization required its network providers (whether last-mile ISPs, backbone
providers, or otherwise) and outsourced information technology providers (including
providers of email, file-storage, DNS, cloud and similar services) to adopt RPKI
signing and filtering as a condition of doing business with it, then those providers
would likely adopt the practice. Once they adopted the practice at the behest of one
client, they could offer RPKI services to other clients, as well. This positive feedback
can help drive RPKI adoption. Recall that RPKI adoption becomes increasingly
60
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valuable to every potential participant as more participants come online. This means
that if a major participant joins the fray, it adds to the incentives for others to
participate. This effect is even more powerful when a major actor uses leverage to
convince others to participate. Procurement contract requirements function as just
that kind of lever.
Who might serve the role of catalyst? One obvious candidate—and a significant
potential actor—is the U.S. federal government. There is ample precedent for the
federal government promoting new technology through procurement policy. For
instance, in 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) sought to promote
adoption of IPv6 by requiring agencies to achieve certain transition benchmarks over
a series of years. As the network security community makes progress towards RPKI
adoption, it should consider whether to encourage OMB to take similar steps with
RPKI.
6. ENSURING OPERATIONAL READINESS
The goal of widespread RPKI adoption is at the heart of this report. But
adoption is only beneficial to the extent it is implemented properly. Indeed, many
interviewees emphasized that widespread RPKI adoption must to be accompanied by
high levels of operational competence to ensure that RPKI is a source of security, and
not a source of newly-introduced problems.
Interviewees who raised this theme tended to coalesce around three main
points. First, network operators that begin making routing decisions based on RPKI
information must adopt best practices when they do so. They must prepare to handle
outages on the part of the RIRs, and they must be ready to failover gracefully. In
short, no informational service is reliable and available 100% of the time, and RPKI
is no exception. As a result, all network operators must ensure that their networks
are resilient in the face of unavailable RPKI publication points and other problems
that may arise despite every participant’s best efforts. Second, interviewees stated
that network operators would benefit from greater clarity regarding how the five
RIRs intend to deliver their RPKI services. Interviewees reported that standardized
and expanded disclosures of service-level intentions among the RIRs would enable
network operators to better prepare themselves for foreseeable contingencies when
relying on RPKI. Third, RIRs must prepare to provide real-time support for RPKI
services.
Although evaluation of particular best practices and service-level intentions
among operators and RIRs is beyond the scope of this report, the general lesson is
essential: it is far more valuable to reduce risks than to allocate them via well-crafted
legal arrangements. At its best, good legal design can incentivize risk reduction, but
the lion’s share of risk reduction will depend on the initiative and ingenuity of
engineers and technical staff at network operators and at the RIRs.
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7. CONCLUSION
This report has evaluated barriers to adoption of RPKI driven by issues of law
in North America, and it has proposed ways to overcome them. These include
alterations to ARIN’s agreements applicable on both the filtering and signing sides
of the RPKI equation. They also include a proposal for using procurement
requirements as a catalyst to adoption. The report is not meant, however, to be a
definitive statement of best practices for the North American network security
community. Rather, it is meant to open dialogue on salient issues facing the
community. Each recommendation would benefit from public discussion and analysis
to surface hidden tradeoffs and to take stock of the Internet community’s priorities.
If the report contributes to more clarity and candor regarding how best to evaluate
the inherent tradeoffs in coordinating a cryptographic security framework in the
decentralized environment of the Internet, then it will have served its purpose.
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